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on account of any disease or injury to health, or on account of death
from any disease or injury to health, in any way contracted, sustained or incurred by such employee in the course of or because of
or arising out of his employment, except only an injury compensable
as an injury by accident under the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act of Colorado.

Taken at face value this section purports to wipe out common
law liability even for diseases which are not compensable under
the Act. The net result of five years of operation of the Act appears to be complete protection to employers and their insurance
from any liability for occupational diseases whatever at the expense of the disabled workmen.

THE EXTENT TO WHICH TAFT-HARTLEY HAS
SUPERSEDED STATE LABOR LAWS
PHILIP HORNBEIN, JR.
of the Denver Bar

When Congress has "occupied a field," state legislation therein is precluded since "a concurrent power in two district sovereignties to regulate the same thing involves ***** a moral and physical
impossibility." 1 The Taft-Hartley law 2 is a comprehensive measure
governing labor relations which affect interstate commerce. Many
states, including Colorado, now have labor relations laws of their
own, and the question of whether state or federal law is controlling
in a particular case is arising with increasing frequency.
There are three types of cases in which this problem may
occur: (1) representation cases-i. e. proceedings for the selection of a collective bargaining representative; (2) proceedings to
authorize the execution of a union-shop agreement; (3) actions,
either civil or criminal, growing out of statutory violations which
are termed "unfair labor practices."
Of course there is no problem presented in any case where
Taft-Hartley can definitely be ruled out of the picture because
interstate commerce is not "affected." '3 However, the nebulous
character of the concept of interstate commerce is well known
and the power of the National Labor Relations Board and other
federal agencies has, in recent years, been extended to activities
4
Still
formerly considered to be purely intrastate in character.
the courts reiterate that there is a line beyond which the federal
'Passenger Cases 7 How. 283, 399 (1849) ; U. S. Constitution, Article VI.
-61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. sec. 141 et seq. (1947).
3 The National Labor Relations Board can act only in cases "affecting commerce"
which is defined to mean "in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the
free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or
obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.' Ibid. sec. 2(7).
4E.g. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); N.R.L.B. v. United Brotherhood
of Carpenters, 181 Fed. 2d 126 (6th Cir. 1950). Cf. Groneman v. International Brotherhood of Electrical workers, 177 Fed. 2d 995 (10th Cir. 1949).
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government cannot go, 5 and it must be presumed that there still is
such a thing as a purely local enterprise, immune from federal
control under the guise of the commerce power. 6 In any event, the
marker delineating state and federal power can only be determined
in a case by case test,7 and any attempt to formulate general principles on this point would be futile.
Assuming that in a particular case commerce is affected within the meaning of Sec. 2(7) of Taft-Hartley, the question then
presented is whether any of the Act's substantive provisions are
applicable. According to recent Supreme Court decisions, the TaftHartley Act belongs to that type of legislation which "completely
occupies the field" and renders inoperative
state laws in cases
8
where the Act's provisions are applicable.
REPRESENTATION

CASES

Since the passage of the Wagner Act" employees have had the
right to choose their collective bargaining representatives in elections conducted by the National Labor Relations Board. An employer is legally obligated to bargain in good faith with the representative so chosen. 10 Many states have set up election machinery
of their own for the selection of bargaining representatives by
employees, and a number of cases have resulted concerning the
power of state agencies to act in cases where interstate commerce
is affected.
In the Bethlehem Steel case" the Supreme Court made it clear
that in any case in which the National Board has jurisdiction to
conduct a representation election, action by a state agency is foreclosed even though the National Board, for reasons of volic, declines to exercise its jurisdiction. Under the Wagner Act, which
was then in effect, supervisory employees were not excluded from
the National Board's jurisdiction, 12 but the Board, as a matter of
policy, declined to conduct elections among foremen.' 3 The New
York Labor Relations Board assumed jurisdiction over them and
conducted elections and made certifications of bargaining representatives. These proceedings of the New York Board were held by the
-Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N.L.R.B.. 303 U.S. 453, 466, 467 (1938) ; Polish

National Alliance v. N.LR.B., 322 U. S. 643, 652, 653 (1944); 10 East 40th Street
Bldg. v. Callus, 325 U. S. 578, 584 (1945).
, But note the assertion of the former General Counsel of the National Board before a Congressional Committee: "The present thought of the Board * * * is that it
is a rare case in which business does not affect commerce in some degree, and that
where commerce Is affected, the Board has jurisdiction".
(Twelfth Intermnediate Rieport of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, May 26, 1948,
page 2). At the same hearing the following collotuy took place between the chairman
of the Committee and the General Counsel: "The Chairman: Well, there is no business, then, that you would not have jurisdiction over?" "Mr. Denham: I can conceive
of very few businesses over which there is not at least technical jurisdiction." (Ibid.
page 3).
'10 East 40th Street Bldg. v. Callus, supra, n. 5.
With the exception of state laws concerning union-shop agreements, infra.
'49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. 151 (1935).
"°Supra,note 2, Sec. 8(a) (5).
1330 U. S. 767 (1946).
11Packard Motor Car Co. v. NT.L.R.B., 3130 U.S. 485 (1946).
18Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733.
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Supreme Court to be of no force or effect
because they encroached
4
upon the power of the National Board.1
The same result was reached in a case arising under the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act, in which the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the rule of the Bethlehem Steel case, and held it equally
applicable under the Taft-Hartley law. " The Wisconsin Supreme
Court had held that the state Board could exercise jurisdiction
until and unless the National Board acted in the matter, 10 but the
U. S. Supreme Court "thought the situation too fraught with potential conflict to permit the intrusion of the state agency, even
though the National Board had not acted ***I' The effect of these
decisions is to leave a vacuum in the area in which the National
Board has jurisdiction, but declines to exercise it. i" Congress attempted to fill this gap by providing that the National Board can
cede jurisdiction to a state agency in certain cases "unless the provision of the state or territorial statute applicable to the determination of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this subchapter or has received a construction inconsistent therewith." 19 In practice this requirement has
made it almost impossible for the Board to cede any of its power
to state agencies since there is almost certain to be some divergence
between the provisions 2 0of state and federal statutes, either as
written or as construed.
CASES INVOLVING UNION SHOP CONTRACTS

This group includes all cases concerning contracts in any form
which require union membership, and which will be referred to
loosely as union-shop contracts. Taft-Hartley and some state laws
require that any contract between an employer and a union which
makes union membership compulsory must be ratified by a certain
percentage of the employees covered. The federal Act requires
approval by "a majority of the employees eligible to vote." 21 Colorado requires that "three-quarters or more of (an employer's) employees shall have voted affirmatively" in favor of such agreement. 22 Wisconsin
requires approval by two-thirds of the employees
23
actually voting.
The Wagner Act contained a specific provision permitting an
employer to execute a union-shop contract with the union which
represented his employees.2 4 There was always some doubt as to
1 Supra, note 11.
,La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S.
18 (1948).
"251 Wis. 583; 40 N.W. 2d 241 (1947).
"336 U.S. 25 (1948).
Th Senate Report No. 105, 80th Congress, April 17, 1947, page 26.
"Supra, note 2, Sec. 10(a).
"We have explored the possibilities of such agreements with several of the state
boards, but thus far we have not concluded any agreements because there are too many
instances where the state statute and the Federal statute are inconsistent." Speech of
N.L.R.B. Associate General Counsel, N.L.R.B. Release R-48, March 10, 1948.
2"Supra, note 2, Sec. 8(a) (3).
-' 1943 Colo. Sessions Laws, Ch. 131, Sec. 6(c).
-'Chapter 424, L. 1945.
-'Supra,
note 9, sec. 8 (3).
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whether this provision of the Wagner Act foreclosed the states
from outlawing such contracts.2 5 With the passage of Taft-Hartley, however, Congress specifically provided in Section 14(b) that
state statutes prohibiting this type of agreement were not superseded by the provisions of Taft-Hartley. The National Board held
that this section did not apply to the Colorado and Wisconsin statutes since they do not completely prohibit union-shop agreements,
but only require approval of such agreements by a certain proportion of the employees. 26 But the Supreme Court held to the contrary in a case arising under the Wisconsin statute. 27 The Court
construed the language of Sec. 14(b) of Taft-Hartley to protect
state laws which regulate the execution of union-shop agreements
as well as those which completely prohibit them.
Confronted with this decision, the National Board ruled that
even though state requirements for approval of union-shop contracts are not superseded by Taft-Hartley, neither is Taft-Hartley
superseded by state law, and, therefore, the concurrent application
of both federal and state law is required.' 8 The practical effect of
these decisions in Colorado is something like this: In an election
for the approval of a union-shop agreement, a majority of all
eligible employees may vote in favor of such agreement, but this
may be less than three-fourths of the employees actually voting,
in which case the contract would be legal under Taft-Hartley, but
illegal under the Colorado Act. In another case, three-fourths of
the employees actually voting might vote affirmatively, but might
not constitute a majority of all employees eligible to vote, in which
case the contract would be legal under Colorado law -9 but not
under Taft-Hartley.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASES

The conflict between state and federal law is equally serious
in unfair labor practice cases. Under Taft-Hartley only the National Board can issue a cease and desist order and petition the
courts for injunctive relief.30 Many state laws, including that of
Colorado, give a private party the right to equitable relief and also
damages against a party guilty of unfair labor practice. The question of whether federal or state law controls is thus of great practical importance. If the conduct complained of is either protected
by the federal Act, or prohibited by it, the case is removed from
the operation of the state law, because, "When Congress has taken
the particular subject matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective
3 In 1949 the Supreme Court held that Sec. 8(4) of the Wagner Act-no longer
in effect-did not affect the power of the states to outlaw or regulate union-shop contracts. Infra, Note 27.
2:6 Northland Greyhound Lines, 80 N.L.R.B. 288.
2, Algona Plywood Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 301
(1949).
2 Western Electric Co., 84 N.L.R.B., No. 111.
2 The Industrial Commission has ruled that the Labor Peace Act requires approval
by three-fourth of the employees actually voting, rather than three-fourth of all employees eligible to vote. (Resolution adopted July 13, 1949).
N Amazon Cotton Mill v. Textile Workers of America, 167 Fed. 2d 183 (1948).
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as opposition, and a state law is not to be declared a help because
' 31
it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go."
Sec. 7 of the federal Act provides in general terms that employees shall have the right to self-organization, collective bargaining, and the right to refrain from such activity. Since the language of Sec. 7 is general, it is not always easy to determine whether a particular state law runs counter to its provisions. A Florida
statute required union business agents to be licensed by a state
board, and required unions to file certain reports and pay an annual fee of one dollar. The Supreme Court held both provisions
invalid because they were in conflict with the provisions of the
then-existing Wagner Act, the purpose of which was "to encourage
collective bargaining, and to protect the full freedom of workers
in the selection of bargaining representatives * * * "" The Court
held that the "full freedom" of employees to self-organization and
collective bargaining was impaired by the Florida law which created an "obstacle to collective bargaining" inconsistent with the federal Act. ":' Sec. 7 of Taft-Hartley purportedly protects the rights
of employees "to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing," and it must therefore be presumed that the
same result would be reached under the present law.
In an earlier case, 34 it was contended that a Texas statute requiring union organizers to obtain an "organizer's card" from the
Secretary of State conflicted with the provisions of the Wagner
Act. The statute was invalidated on the grounds that it violated
the First Amendment, but the opinion stated that a majoriy of
the court did not agree that it conflicted with the provisions of
he Wagner Act. 35 Presumably the distinction which the Court
made between the Texas and Florida statutes was that the issuance
of a license in Florida was discretionary with the state board, but
in Texas the applicant was entitled to an "organizer's card" as a
matter of right.
*

BALANCING THE POLICE POWER

v.

FEDERAL LAW

The Supreme Court has made it clear that the states still may
exercise their police power in a labor dispute to prevent violence
and disorder. The Court held that the Wagner Act did not protect
"mass picketing, threats, or violence," 36 and that, therefore a
restraining order, issued under the Wisconsion Employment Peace
Act,3 7 which enjoined such conduct, did not deprive the defendants
of their rights under the Wagner Act. The Court held that an "intention of Congress to exclude states from exerting their police
31 Justice Holmes in Charleston &
597, 604 (1911).

'Hill

WV.C.R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S,

v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 541 (1944).

":325 U.S. 543 (1944).
a Thomas v. Collins, 323

323 U.S. 542 (1944).

L.S. 516 (194A).

a Allen-Bradley Local Union %*. Wisconsin Employment
740 (1941).

31Ch. 57, Laws of 1939.

lelations Board,

315 U.S.
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power must be clearly manifested, ' 3 8 and'39that the federal Act is
plainly not "a mere police court measure.
In a later case, 40 also arising under the Wisconsin statute,
the Court held that the police power of the states in labor disputes
is not confined to cases of physical violence or breaches of the
peace. The union in that case had engaged in a novel form of strike
activity in which "the stratgem consisted of calling repeated special meetings of the Union during working hours at any time the
Union saw fit, which the employees would leave work to attend.
It was an essential part of the plan that this should be without
warning to the employer or notice as to when or whether the employees would return."41 The defendant union contended that the
intermittent work stoppages constituted "concerted activity for the
purpose of collective bargaining" and were therefore protected by
Sec. 7 of the federal Act and immune from state legislation. The
Court held to the contrary. Although several pages of the decision
were devoted to this point, its rationale is obscure, at least to this
writer. The Court holds that the conduct of the union was not
"concerted activity" within the meaning of Sec. 7. However, it
appears that the intermittent work stoppages were part of a dispute concerning the terms of a new collective bargaining agreement, the old one having expired. 42 Admittedly the workers could
have engaged in an all-out strike which would have been protected
by Sec. 7. It is therefore difficult to understand the basis of the
Court's distinction between "concerted activities" which are protected by Sec. 7, and those which are not. There is nothing in the
Court's decision which is of any help in determining in future
cases whether particular types of union activity are protected or
unprotected by Sec. 7. The Court seems to take the the view that
in order to come under the protection of Sec. 7 workers must confine themselves to orthodox types of "concerted activities." But
the mere fact that conduct is novel does not mean that it is
malum.43
ARE NEW STRIKE WEAPONS PROHIBITED?

It would not seem that the fact that the strike in this case
was unique in its nature would of. itself remove it from the protection of Sec. 7. If this is the rule which the Court means to adopt,
then labor unions will be unable to evolve new methods and techniques in industrial disputes, although there is no inhibition on
the ingenuity of employers in their efforts to devise new ways of
resisting the demands of their workers.
Until the decision of the Supreme Court in the Plankinton
-315 U.S. 749
"315 U.S. 748
Si0International
(1948).
4 336 U.S. 249
4 Ibid.
4 Cf. dissenting

(1941).
(1941).
Union

v.

Visconsin

];nll)uvnient

(1948).
opinion, 336 U.S. 265

(1948).
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Packing Company case44 on February 13, 1950, there was no controlling decision in a case where the conduct sought to be enjoined
under state law was also prescribed by Taft-Hartley. The Supreme
Court decisions already referred to indicate that under the general principles of supersedure of state law by federal law, state
action would be foreclosed relative to any conduct over which the
National Board is given jurisdiction. The Court had already held
that state labor tribunals could not conduct representation elections among employees subject to the federal Act, and that state
laws could not destroy or impair rights granted to employees by
federal law. Still to be decided was whether a state court could
enjoin conduct which was prohibited not only by state law but by
Taft-Hartley as well. In a six-line memorandum opinion, the
United States Supreme Court held in effect that a state tribunal
has no power to enjoin acts which constitute unfair labor practices
under Taft-Hartley, even though such acts are also proscribed by
state law. 45 The decision contains no discussion of the problems
presented, but simply reverses the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court with reference to the Bethlehem Steel"6 and LaCrosse
Telephone, 7 cases. The Court apparently considered the principle
of the supremacy of federal law and its proper application so well
settled that discussion was unnecessary.
CASES UPHOLDING FEDERAL LAW

The important effect of this decision on the whole problem of
supersedure of state labor laws by the federal Act justifies a
recitation of the facts as gleaned from the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.48 The complaining party, Stokes, was a former
employee of the Plankinton Packing Company which was admittedly engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of
Taft-Hartley. Stokes charged that he was discharged by the company because he was not a member of the C. I. 0. Packing House
Workers Union, and that his discharge was therefore in violation
of the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act. 49 He further alleged that
his discharge had been brought about by the conduct of the C. I. 0.
union through acts of coercion and intimidation and that both the
union and the company were in violation of the Wisconsin Act.
The Wisconsin Board found in favor of the complaining party and
ordered his re-employment, together with compensation for the
wages which he had lost. The decision of the Board was upheld
and enforced by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The basis of the
United States Supreme Court's reversal was undoubtedly the fact
that the acts of the defendants, which the Wisconsin court found
to be inviolation of the Wisconsin statute, also constituted viola9 Plankinton
953 (1950).

Packing Co. v.

Wisconsin

0 Ibid.
4 Supra, note 11.
47 Supra, note 15.
"225 Wis. 285, 38 N.W. 2d 688 (1949).
49 Supra, note 37.
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